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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
 
Timothy Hanson (―Tim‖) appeals the Memorandum Order of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania adopting the Magistrate Judge‘s 
Report and Recommendation (―R&R‖) and ordering that Tim‘s petition seeking the 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus be denied.  The Court determined that Tim was not 
denied effective assistance of counsel.  Tim argues that the Court‘s determination was 
based on an unreasonable application of the law and on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in evidence.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential 
facts.  
On the afternoon of December 24, 1987, Tim (then fifteen years old), his older 
brother, Tom Hanson (―Tom‖) (then twenty years old), and Tom‘s girlfriend, Betty Jo 
Wootan
1
 (―Betty Jo‖) (then sixteen years old), were at the Hanson family‘s house.  David 
Smith, Tom‘s friend, came to the front door of the house as Tim, Tom, and Betty Jo sat in 
the living room.  David was told to go to the back door, by the kitchen, because the front 
door was stuck.  When David went to the kitchen and walked into the house, he was shot 
                                                 
1
 As a result of a plea bargain that dismissed charges of interference with the custody of 
children and corruption of minors, Tom had pled guilty to, and was on probation for, 
disorderly conduct. 
 3 
and killed by a single gunshot from a shotgun that Tom owned.  Tim, Tom, and Betty Jo 
left the house and walked or ran back and forth between the woods and the house several 
times.  Other Hanson family members arrived at the house shortly after the shooting and 
contacted local authorities.  Helen, a sibling of Tim and Tom, also came to the Hanson 
house.  Betty Jo left the scene through the woods and did not return that day.  
Pennsylvania State Troopers arrived and Tom and Tim came out of the woods and met 
with the troopers.   
After being advised of his Miranda rights, Tim told a trooper that he had been 
trying to fix the shotgun when it fired accidentally.  Tim did not agree to have his hands 
tested to determine whether he had fired a gun recently.  Tom told the troopers that Tim 
shot David and he allowed testing of his hands to determine whether he had fired a gun 
recently.  The test indicated that the levels of chemicals present on his hands were 
insignificant.  Tom also had a burn or mark on the right side of his face that, at trial, the 
Commonwealth argued was the result of Tom‘s proximity to Tim‘s gunshot blast. 
Tim was arrested that same day, December 24, 1987, and charged with criminal 
homicide, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 2501A.  F. Cortez Bell and Christopher Shaw of 
the Clearfield County public defender‘s office were appointed to represent Tim.  Judge 
John K. Reilly, Jr. denied counsel‘s motion to certify Tim as a juvenile.  He was tried as 
an adult. 
Tom and Betty Jo testified at trial that Tom opened the back door for David and 
that Tim loaded Tom‘s shotgun, then went into the kitchen, and fired a single shot past 
Tom and at David, killing David.  Tom and Betty Jo also testified that Tim took David‘s 
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glasses and ran into the woods.  Tom and Betty Jo said they chased Tim after he ran into 
the woods and they tried to convince Tim to go back to the house and report the matter.  
They testified that Tim told Helen he would pay her if she drove him to Florida.  Tom 
and Betty Jo said that they did not know why Tim shot David.  
At trial, Tim told his counsel, and testified to, a different account of the events 
than the one he had told the troopers the day of the shooting — he now said that Tom had 
accidentally shot David during a prank.
2
  Tim stated that, when David arrived, Tim went 
with Tom and Betty Jo into the bedroom and they saw, through the bedroom window, 
that David was at the door.  According to Tim, Tom suggested they play ―a little joke‖ on 
David — that Tom would scare him with the shotgun.  Tim testified that he opened the 
door for David and Tom came into the kitchen with the shotgun.  Although Tom intended 
to scare David as a prank, Tim stated that he thought the shotgun ―went off‖ accidentally.  
(App. at 611a.)  Tim testified that, on the walks into the woods after the shooting, Tom 
had convinced him to take responsibility for the shooting because, as a juvenile, Tim 
would be treated more leniently.  Tim said he had lied to the troopers on the day David 
was killed when he said the gun went off accidentally as he was cleaning it.   
                                                 
2
 During cross-examination at trial, Tim testified that he first told defense attorneys this 
new account during the second day of trial.  (App. at 638a; 642a; 647a–48a.)  Defense 
counsel repeatedly tried to help Tim remember that he told them on the first day of trial.  
(App. at 647a–48a.)  Defense counsel also cross-examined Tom on the first day of trial in 
a manner indicating that the theory of the case at that time was consistent with Tim‘s new 
account.  (App. at 171a (defense counsel asked Tom if he had ―fired that gun,‖ if he was 
sure he ―didn‘t tell Tim to take the rap‖ because Tim was a juvenile).)  Tim now claims 
that he was confused about the days and that he told his trial counsel the account of 
events that he testified to before any testimony began on the first day of trial.  
(Appellant‘s Br. 52–53.)   
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Janet Lindberg, Tim‘s sister, and Bertha Hanson, Tim‘s mother, testified that they 
heard Tom tell Betty Jo, ―if I go down, you‘re going down, too, Bitch.‖  (App. at 653a; 
659a.)  Tim‘s mother also testified that, on the night of the shooting, Tom told her that 
he, not Tim, had shot David.  
The jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree.  On January 17, 1989, 
Tim received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
In 1993, after his appeal was dismissed because his court-appointed attorneys had 
failed to make the necessary filings, Tim filed a pro se Post Conviction Relief Act 
(―PCRA‖) petition to have his appellate rights reinstated.  An evidentiary hearing was 
held and Tim‘s PCRA petition was granted — his appellate rights were reinstated.  On 
November 18, 1999, the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County, Pennsylvania 
issued an Opinion and Order dismissing Tim‘s petition under the PCRA and denying all 
relief.   
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Tim filed a timely, counseled habeas corpus petition 
to the United States District Court on February 25, 2002.  Magistrate Judge Keith A. 
Pesto was assigned the matter and issued his R&R denying the habeas petition on 
September 12, 2008 — more than six years after the petition was filed.3  Tim‘s objections 
to the R&R were summarily denied by the District Court.  Further, the District Court 
denied Tim‘s Certificate of Appealability (―COA‖) on September 29, 2008.  
 Although Tim sought relief on a number of grounds related to ineffective 
                                                 
3
 We are aware of no justification for the shocking delay of over six years between the 
filing of the habeas corpus petition and the issuance of the Magistrate Judge‘s R&R.   
 6 
assistance of counsel, we granted a COA only on the claims arising from: defense 
counsel soliciting, and failing to object to, Trooper Brown‘s testimony regarding Tim‘s 
invocation of his rights to silence and counsel; defense counsel stipulating to evidence 
regarding Tim‘s juvenile proceedings; defense counsel soliciting testimony from David‘s 
girlfriend, Sara Brant; and defense counsel failing to object to testimony of David‘s mom, 
Linda Pollard.  We denied the request for a COA on all other issues presented in the 
request.    
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over Tim‘s petition seeking the issuance 
of a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have jurisdiction to review 
the District Court‘s denial of the writ, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253.4   
When reviewing a district court decision regarding a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, we must ―apply the same standards as the 
District Court, as mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996‖ (―AEDPA‖).  Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 99 (3d Cir. 2005).  Section 2254(d) 
provides that, where, as here, a habeas petitioner‘s claim was adjudicated on the merits in 
a state court proceeding, a federal court may grant a habeas corpus petition only if the 
petitioner establishes that the state court proceedings: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
                                                 
4
 Although Appellant presents arguments regarding his trial counsel‘s failure to object to 
cross-examination questions asked of Tim, our limited COA does not include this issue. 
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  We must presume that the state court‘s findings of fact are correct 
unless the findings are not fairly supported by the record or the petitioner rebuts the 
presumption of correctness with clear and convincing evidence.  Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 99 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1)); Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664, 667 (3d Cir. 1998).   
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a 
―‗conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 
the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of 
materially indistinguishable facts.‘‖  Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 51 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)).  A state court decision is 
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if the court ―identifies the 
correct governing legal rule from the Supreme Court‘s cases but unreasonably applies it 
to the facts of the particular case,‖ ―unreasonably extends a legal principle from the 
Supreme Court‘s precedent to a new context where it should not apply,‖ or ―unreasonably 
refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.‖  Gattis v. Snyder, 
278 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407).  ―To find a state 
court‘s application of Supreme Court precedent ‗unreasonable,‘ the state court decision 
must be ‗more than incorrect or erroneous‘; it must have been ‗objectively 
unreasonable.‘‖  Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452, 462 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Wiggins 
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)). 
 8 
III. ANALYSIS 
For AEDPA purposes, the clearly established federal law for ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims is the two-prong test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors 
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ―counsel‖ 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, 
the defendant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel‘s 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 




   
To establish deficiency in counsel performance, a defendant must show that 
counsel‘s performance ―fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.‖  Id. at 688.  
Our scrutiny of counsel‘s performance must be highly deferential and we must make 
every effort ―to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel‘s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel‘s perspective at the time.‖  Id. at 689.  There is a strong presumption that 
counsel‘s performance is within the wide range of reasonable assistance and the 
defendant must overcome the assumption that the challenged action might be sound trial 
strategy.  Id. 
                                                 
5
 Our analysis of the deficiency and prejudice prongs does not have to proceed in any 
specific order; it is likely often ―easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.‖  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.  
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To show prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that the act or omission 
―actually had an adverse effect on the defense.‖  Id. at 693.  According to Strickland, 
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. 
 
Id. at 694.  We must consider the totality of the evidence because ―a verdict or conclusion 
only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than 
one with overwhelming record support.‖  Id. at 696.   
Showing that counsel‘s performance was deficient ―requires showing that counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‗counsel‘ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.‖  Id. at 687 (emphasis added).  Thus, deficiency may 
be assessed by considering multiple alleged errors together, rather than requiring that any 
single error render counsel ineffective.  Similarly, showing that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant ―requires showing that counsel‘s errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.‖  Id.  (emphasis added).  This language implies that, 
while each alleged error may not individually be prejudicial to the defense, the errors 
may be prejudicial when combined.  Id.       
Our standard of review is ―doubly deferential‖ because both AEDPA and 
Strickland are highly deferential standards.  Knowles v. Mirzayance, --- U.S. ----, ----, 
129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009). 
To evaluate whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court‘s rejection of Tim‘s claim 
either is contrary to, or involved an objectively unreasonable application of, Strickland, 
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we begin by determining whether the standard employed by the state court is ―contrary 
to,‖ or contradicted by, Strickland.  The Superior Court‘s test presumes that trial counsel 
was effective and, to rebut that presumption, the petitioner must show:  
(1) that the claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no 
reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; 
and, (3) that, but for the errors and omissions of counsel, 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
proceedings would have been different. 
 
(App. at 1163a (citing Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa. 1999)).)  The 
Superior Court‘s presumption is the same as the presumption in Strickland and the 
Superior Court divides Strickland‘s two prongs into three prongs.  Thus, the Superior 
Court‘s standard is substantively identical to Strickland and is not contrary to Strickland.  
See Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 202–04 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a Pennsylvania 
state court applying the Pennsylvania ineffective assistance of counsel standard did not 
contradict Strickland).   
Next, we determine whether the Superior Court‘s application of the law was 
―objectively unreasonable.‖  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520.   
A. Invocation of rights to silence and counsel 
Tim claims ineffective assistance of counsel occurred during testimony regarding 
his invocation of his rights to silence and counsel.  At trial, after Trooper Brown 
(―Brown‖) explained that he had tested Tom‘s hands for gunshot residue on the day of 
the shooting, the Commonwealth asked why Tim‘s hands were not tested for gunshot 
residue.  Brown responded, ―he said that he wasn‘t going to permit it, to say anything to 
us, and he requested his attorney.‖  (App. at 552a.)  Defense counsel did not object and 
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direct examination of Brown ended soon after Brown gave this testimony.  On cross-
examination of Brown, defense counsel stated, ―[i]n relationship to what you just said, it 
sounds to me like Mr. Hanson exercised his Miranda rights, for his right to speak to an 
attorney before talking to you, et cetera; is that right?‖  (App. at 553a.)  Tim claims that 
his counsel was ineffective when neither of them objected to the Commonwealth‘s 
questions and when defense counsel mentioned Tim‘s invocation of his Miranda rights.  
1. Refusing the gunshot residue test 
The court was not objectively unreasonable in concluding that defense counsel‘s 
failure to object during Brown‘s testimony was not an error so serious as to render 
counsel‘s performance deficient.  The trooper testified that Tim did not have his hands 
tested because ―he said he wasn‘t going to permit it.‖  (App. at 552a.)  Under Supreme 
Court and Pennsylvania precedent, the testimony that Tim did not permit a gunshot 
residue test does not implicate Tim‘s right to silence because the admission into evidence 
of a defendant‘s refusal to submit to a physical test does not offend the right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.  See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 
564 (1983); Commonwealth v. Monahan, 549 A.2d 231, 235–36 (Pa. 1988). 
2. Invoking right to silence 
After being asked why the gunshot residue test was not conducted on Tim‘s hands, 
Brown answered that Tim said ―he wasn‘t going to  . . . say anything to us, and he 
requested his attorney.‖  (App. at 552a.)  Because Brown‘s statement was an unsolicited 
passing reference to Tim‘s invocation of his rights, the Commonwealth‘s question is not 
inherently objectionable.  Even if counsel was deficient in not objecting and not moving 
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for a mistrial, the Superior Court‘s finding that this testimony did not result in actual 
prejudice is not objectively unreasonable.   
Shortly before invoking his rights to silence and to an attorney, Tim confessed to 
troopers that he was holding the shotgun when it went off.  Because Tim had already 
confessed, the jury would have no reason to assume Tim‘s silence demonstrated guilt.  
The abundance of other evidence of Tim‘s guilt, including Tom‘s and Betty Jo‘s 
testimony, Tim‘s initial statement to the troopers, and the results of Tom‘s gunshot 
residue test, make it reasonable to conclude that the outcome of the trial would have been 
the same even without this alleged error.  Thus, the court was not objectively 
unreasonable by concluding that the prejudice prong was not met. 
Additionally, the court was not objectively unreasonable in finding that defense 
counsel‘s performance was not deficient when counsel referenced and solicited testimony 
regarding Tim‘s invocation of his right to remain silent.  On cross-examination of a 
witness who referred to Tim‘s invocation of his rights to silence and counsel, Tim‘s 
counsel said, in part, ―it sounds to me like Mr. Hanson exercised his Miranda rights, or 
his right to speak to an attorney before talking to you, et cetera; is that right?‖  (App. at 
553a.)  Trial counsel stated that he referred to Tim‘s invocation of his rights ―to convey 
that [Tim] exercising his constitutional rights was a proper and common thing to do‖ ―in 
an effort to minimize any negative inference.‖  (App. at 1152a.)   
After Trooper Brown responded to the question, defense counsel asked, ―[h]ad 
Corporal Wrable already spoken to [Tim], however, if you know, prior to your arrival?‖  
(App. at 553a.)  This second cross-examination question shows the broader context of the 
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question regarding Tim‘s invocation of his Miranda rights.  Defense counsel was likely 
trying to emphasize that Tim had already been cooperative and made a statement to the 
troopers prior to invoking his right to silence.  Moreover, it is reasonable for a court to 
conclude that the statements on direct examination regarding Tim‘s invocation were 
unsolicited passing references.  On these facts, a court could reasonably conclude that 
Tim‘s defense counsel‘s reference to the invocation could be a strategic choice that fell 
within the wide range of reasonable and effective assistance of counsel.   
Because the court was not objectively unreasonable in finding that Tim did not 
establish error regarding his counsel‘s reference to his invocation, we need not reach the 
issue of prejudice. 
B. Stipulation to evidence regarding Tim’s juvenile proceedings6 
During Tom‘s testimony at trial, Tom testified that, before the shooting, he was 
talking to Tim about ―turning himself in‖ to ―the law.‖  (App. at 76a.)  Defense counsel 
made no objection.  Next, the Commonwealth asked why Tim and Tom were discussing 
Tim turning himself in.  Defense counsel objected.
7
  The Commonwealth asked no 
further questions about Tim‘s juvenile proceedings during Tom‘s testimony.   
Later on during the trial, defense counsel stipulated to reading certain statements 
that specific state troopers would have testified to and introduced into evidence, had they 
indeed testified.  Specifically, defense counsel stipulated to testimony that would have 
                                                 
6
 Although both Appellant and Appellees refer to this issue as a stipulation to admit 
Tim‘s ―juvenile record,‖ there was no juvenile record admitted into evidence under this 
stipulation. 
7
 There is a dispute regarding whether the objection was overruled or sustained, which we 
need not resolve now.   
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been given by Sergeant Smeal — that visitation records at the Clearfield County Jail 
indicated that Helen Gallaher, Tim‘s sister, visited Tim at the jail six times from 1987 to 
1988.  Defense counsel also stipulated to testimony that would have been given by 
Trooper Zimmerman — that he had gone to the Hanson home twice in December 1987, 
looking for Tim because Tim, on December 2, 1987, had left a juvenile facility where he 
had been placed the previous day by court order as a result of a separate juvenile charge 
that was irrelevant to the instant case.
8
 
Appellant claims that defense counsel stipulating to these statements regarding 
Tim‘s juvenile proceedings was deficient performance of counsel that prejudiced the 
defense even though Tom had already testified without objection, prior to the stipulation, 
regarding Tim potentially turning himself in to the law.  Appellant‘s COA did not claim 
ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel‘s failure to object to Tom‘s first 
reference to Tim turning himself in to the law.         
The Superior Court was not objectively unreasonable in concluding that entering 
into this stipulation was not deficient performance.  Prior to the stipulation, the court had 
allowed testimony regarding Tim running from the house after the shooting, pursuant to 
Pennsylvania case law, and the court had informed the jury that Tim‘s flight could be 
evidence of his consciousness of guilt.  The court found that defense counsel entering 
                                                 
8
 Defense counsel stipulated to testimony that would have been given by other troopers, 
but this other evidence is not related to Tim‘s juvenile proceedings and is not at issue on 
appeal.  Defense counsel stipulated that Trooper Davidson would testify that he had been 
to the Hanson home twenty-three times during 1987  because he was looking for Carl 
Hanson, Jr., Tim‘s brother, on unrelated charges and that Trooper Davidson usually heard 
voices coming from inside the home, but nobody would answer the door for him. 
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into the stipulation was a strategic choice to explain that Tim went into the woods after 
the shooting, not because he was the shooter, but because he did not want to be detained 
due to his juvenile proceedings.   
Tim asserts that defense counsel objecting to the questions regarding his juvenile 
proceedings during Tom‘s testimony demonstrates that stipulating to the admission of 
similar testimony later was ineffective assistance of counsel.  The Magistrate Judge 
opined that this shift in strategy could be explained by defense counsel not learning of 
Tim‘s new account of events until the second day of trial, which was after Tom‘s 
testimony.  Even though Tim‘s counsel was aware of his new description of the shooting 
shortly before Tom testified on the first day of trial, defense counsel might not have had 
sufficient time to develop, or act according to, the new theory of the case during Tom‘s 
testimony.   
Alternatively, defense counsel could have made a strategic decision to object to 
Tom‘s testimony while later stipulating to testimony regarding similar topics.9  Tim‘s 
counsel could have stipulated to the additional information as part of a strategic decision 
because Tom‘s testimony that he talked to Tim about Tim ―turning himself in‖ to ―the 
law‖ was already in evidence and because it is likely that the evidence in the stipulation 
would have been admitted under Pennsylvania precedent.  Evidence of criminal charges, 
crimes, wrongs, or acts can be admissible for the limited purpose of establishing motive.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Glover, 286 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. 1972).  ―It is well settled that 
                                                 
9
 Defense counsel may have objected to similar testimony from Tom because Tom may 
have testified to incriminating facts or statements made by Tim that were not included in 
the testimony to which defense counsel later stipulated. 
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‗[e]vidence to prove motive, or intent, or plan, or design, or ill will or malice is always 
admissible.‘‖  Commonwealth v. Glover, 286 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. 1972) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 161 A.2d 861, 870 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 846 (1961)).   
This evidence regarding Tim‘s juvenile proceedings would likely have been 
admissible under Pennsylvania case law.
10
  Tim argues that defense counsel‘s failure to 
request a limiting instruction for this evidence was deficient performance of counsel.  
However, the statement was merely that Tim had ―a separate juvenile charge, that 
juvenile charge having nothing to do with the case,‖ so it is unlikely that this statement 
would unduly prejudice Tim‘s defense or lead a jury to make improper conclusions 
regarding character in a murder trial.   
Because the state court‘s decision regarding the stipulation was not objectively 
unreasonable, we need not inquire into prejudice.  Even if defense counsel did not 
stipulate to the admission of the juvenile proceedings, the fact that the evidence was 
likely admissible to prove motive and that Tom testified to talking with Tim about Tim 
―turning himself in‖ to ―the law‖ would have made it reasonable for the state court to 
conclude that the trial result would have been the same, even without the stipulation.
11
    
C. Testimony of Sara Brant 
                                                 
10
 Although Tim claims that admission of this evidence would have been prohibited by 42 
Pa. C.S.A. § 6354, which, at the time Hanson was tried, prohibited admission of juvenile 
dispositions against a defendant in a criminal proceeding, it is not clear that evidence 
regarding Hanson‘s escape from a juvenile facility would have been barred.  
Consequently, under these circumstances, Hanson‘s attorney could have entered into the 
stipulation for strategic reasons. 
11
 On direct examination, defense counsel solicited testimony from Tim regarding his 
―burglary charge‖ and Tim leaving the juvenile facility.  (App. at 597a.)  
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At trial, the Commonwealth asked Tom about a statement he allegedly made to 
David, David‘s girlfriend (Sara Brant), and David‘s mother (Linda Pollard).  Defense 
counsel objected to the question.  Outside of the jury‘s presence, the Commonwealth 
stated that they were trying to introduce statements Tom allegedly made.  Specifically, 
his statement that, if he and Tim thought ―pigs‖ were at their door, ―they‖ would shoot.  
(App. at 117a–20a.)  The Court declined to admit the statement because it was hearsay 
unless Tim, not Tom, had made the statement.  (App. at 120a.)  The Commonwealth 
tried, once again, to ask Tom about the statement.  Defense counsel objected and, after a 
sidebar, Tom denied making the alleged statement to Linda Pollard.  Defense counsel 
called Sara Brant and solicited testimony from her regarding the same statement.  She 
said that she heard Tom tell David the day before the shooting that David, ―better make 
sure that they knew who he was when he came or else they‘d shoot.‖  (App. at 592a–
93a.) 
The Superior Court was not objectively unreasonable when it found that defense 
counsel soliciting this testimony from Sara Brant was not deficient performance.  The 
Court found that trial counsel had a ―reasonable strategic basis‖ for this decision; trial 
counsel testified that the testimony fit into Tim‘s defense theory.  (App. at 1165a.)  
Although Tim argues that this testimony fit the Commonwealth‘s theory and not the 
defense theory, it is not objectively unreasonable to conclude that defense counsel might 
have reasonably chosen to use the testimony ―to show that it was more plausible for Tom 
to be the shooter because he was the person who‖ stated that ―we‘d shoot.‖  (App. at 
1165a–66a.)  That defense counsel objected to the Commonwealth‘s earlier attempts to 
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solicit similar testimony from Tom does not make counsel‘s subsequent solicitation of 
this testimony unreasonable.     
Because the Superior Court was not objectively unreasonable in finding that this 
solicitation of testimony was not error, we need not inquire into prejudice. 
D. Testimony of Linda Pollard 
During the direct examination of Linda Pollard, David‘s mother, the 
Commonwealth solicited testimony that David had a child ―on the way‖ and that David 
had planned to marry Sara Brant.  (App. at 417a.)  Defense counsel did not object.  Tim 
argues that the lack of objection deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.   
The state court was not objectively unreasonable in finding that the failure to 
object did not prejudice Tim‘s defense.  Even though this testimony was arguably 
irrelevant, Tim did not demonstrate that these statements were ―so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial‖ or that, but for the failure to object, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.   
Because the state court was not objectively unreasonable in reaching its 
conclusion regarding prejudice on this concern, we need not inquire into whether defense 
counsel was deficient.  
 19 
 
E. The aggregated alleged deficiencies 
Finally, Tim argues that the state court unreasonably concluded that counsel‘s 
errors, in the aggregate, were prejudicial under Strickland.
12
  This argument is foreclosed 
by the fact that, with the potential exception of the testimony of Linda Pollard, we have 
upheld the state court‘s findings that counsel‘s performance was not otherwise deficient.  
Here, counsel‘s alleged errors, individually or collectively, do not amount to a 
constitutional violation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 
                                                 
12
 The language of Strickland implies that, while alleged errors may not individually be 
deficient performance of counsel or prejudicial to the defense, the errors may be deficient 
performance of counsel or prejudicial when combined.  See Strickland,  466 U.S. at 687 
(referring to analyzing errors, in plural, in the standard for ineffective assistance of 
counsel — showing that counsel‘s performance was deficient ―requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‗counsel‘ 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,‖ and showing the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant ―requires showing that counsel‘s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial‖ (emphases added)).   
